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Since Gayle Salamon’s 2018 article “What is Critical about Critical Phenomenology?”, 
phenomenologists and critical theorists have offered various responses to the question 
this title poses. In doing this, they articulated the following considerations: is renewed 
criticality targeting the phenomenological method itself, does it expand its subject matter to 
marginalized experiences, does it retool key phenomenological concepts?1 One aspect of  this 
debate that has been left under-interrogated, however, is the word “phenomenology” itself. 
There is after all another question to ask in this context: what is phenomenological about critical 
phenomenology? Many avenues of  response are of  course possible. Phenomenology could 
most broadly be meant as an approach that concerns itself  with what is given in experience 
in order to describe the structures of  that givenness. From a Husserlian perspective, pure 
phenomenology is the science which concerns itself  with phenomena in the full and diverse 
sense of  the word—not as understood by specific natural or human sciences. What is 
distinctive of  phenomenology is thus not what subset or type of  phenomena it is interested 
in but how it relates to them, which, as Husserl introduces Ideas I, happens “in a completely 
different attitude.”2 
 While no agreement has been reached about the term “critical phenomenology,” 
a consensus has nevertheless emerged: this “critical turn” involves a commitment to 
something more than description, namely to a practice with specific, situated ends. The 
introduction to 50 Concepts for a Critical* Phenomenology labels it an “ameliorative” project 
(Weiss, Murphy, and Salamon, 2020, xiv). Duane D. Davis (2020) suggests intersectional 
1 See notably Aldea, Smaranda Andra, David Carr and Sara Heinëmaa, eds. 2021 (forthcoming).; Lisa 
Guenther (2020, 2021); Al-Saji (2019). 
2 The notion of  attitudes is central to phenomenology, yet its various differentiations are not as often 
developed as the main distinction between the natural and phenomenological attitudes. In his very 
informative book Husserl’s Transcendental Phenomenology: Nature, Spirit, and Life (2014), Andrea Staiti lists 
many of  those different attitudes in view of  showing how the Husserlian notion of  attitude responds to 
the Neo-Kantian account of  standpoint (104-08). Even Staiti, however, does not specifically distinguish 
between the volitive and evaluative attitudes, or track the differences between attitudes which correspond 
to the different spheres of  reason. Yet this is a distinction which is crucial to present purposes, because 
the evaluative sphere is affective, or can also be called aesthetic, while strictly speaking only the volitive 
concerns the realm of  praxis. What is more, even when scholarship turns to Husserl’s ethics in particular, 
those distinctions are usually not emphasized. See notably: Ullrich Melle (2007); Sophie Loidolt (2009); 
Henning Peucker (2008); Sara Heinämaa (2014), to name only a few.
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phenomenology even holds “praxial promise” (6). Lisa Guenther perhaps most explicitly ties 
critical phenomenology to a political practice, defining it as a “struggle for liberation” and 
a commitment to a “restructuring [of] the world” (15). In describing the world-destroying 
effects of  prolonged solitary confinement, or how perceptual practices of  suspicious 
surveillance expose targeted others to state violence, Guenther performs what she calls a 
“hybrid phenomenological practice” of  description and calls for transformation.3 Alia Al-
Saji importantly differs from Guenther in this respect by engaging Frantz Fanon’s aporetic 
account of  liberation. Fanon does not adhere to a clear single philosophical method, and 
Al-Saji (2019a) suggests that no practical program or hopes of  “changing the world” should 
guide critical phenomenology (2).4 Instead, she develops a phenomenology of  racialized 
affect that proposes to dwell on, even touch, as Fanon writes, the wounds of  colonialism. 
 Despite critical phenomenology’s tendency to focus on developing a type of  critical 
praxis, both the differences and continuities between Guenther’s and Al-Saji’s perspectives 
can be productively explored through the lens of  Husserlian phenomenology. Specifically, 
turning to Husserl’s account of  attitude reveals how critical phenomenology can be 
understood as employing a plurality of  “methods” through what turns out to be a plurality 
of  attitudes. While Guenther and Al-Saji answer differently to Salamon’s question “what 
is critical about critical phenomenology,” such a focus on attitudes is able to connect their 
accounts while clarifying what separates them, in particular when it comes to understanding 
the role of  transformative praxis. 
 For Husserl, there are three spheres of  reason (Vernunfsphäre)—judging, valuing and 
willing—which allow for their distinctive attitudes: theoretical, aesthetic or affective, and 
practical.5 Accordingly, a complete phenomenology of  reason has to include branches 
dedicated not only to judgment, but to axiology and praxis. What is important about this 
parallel is that while to judge is to posit being, valuing and willing involve different position 
takings.6 To value and will, feel, act, or desire, are intentional acts that constitute sense, but 
this sense is not reducible to the doxic theses, as Husserl calls them, implicit in such acts. 
3 See Guenther (2013, 2019).
4 Al-Saji cites: “There is a point where methods devour themselves” [Il y a un point où les méthodes se résorbent] 
(Fanon 1967, 5).
5 Husserl makes this recurring point in various contexts. See notably Husserl, Ideas I, 291/304 and 
349ff.; The Idea of  Phenomenology, 70; Hua 37, 260-01; See also Dominique Pradelle (2009) for an account 
of  the difficulty to understand these different spheres as unified under the label of  “general reason.” 
Additionally, though the plurality of  attitudes corresponding to these spheres usually goes unnoticed, see 
Andrea Staiti (2014, 98) for an account of  the many kinds of  attitudes.
6 “Positionality” broadly refers, as Husserl describes in Formal and Transcendental Logic, to the any taking of  
position, whether judicative, volitive or valuative, and whether explicit or implicit, that is, whether it is also 
made thematic in a doxic position or not (see Husserl 1969, 136; 2014, 233). The sense of  the proposition 
that correlates with the position is the “something meant” in a broadened manner (see Husserl 2004, 
260; Husserl 2014, 227). Moreover, Husserl constantly makes passing references to these other attitudes 
and the distinct reflections they allow. See notably First Philosophy, 2019, 227/23-24; 303/99, Ideas II, 
1989, 183-94/173-85, and Formal and Transcendental Logic, 1969, 135/120, and perhaps most explicitly, 
from Husserl’s 1920 lectures on ethics, the section entitled “Der Unterschied zswichen der axiologischen und der 
ethischen Einstellung” (2004, 244-47).
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What I intend through a feeling of  value, for example, is not the same as what I intend 
through the doxic act on which the feeling is founded; perceiving a flower as beautiful is 
not the same as positing this flower as being. This difference between valuing and judging 
holds even if  what Husserl thinks is a feeling of  value (in this case beauty) is dependent on a 
judgment about the being of  the flower. In other words, for Husserl, each sphere of  reason 
is defined by different manners of  givenness: something valued and something willed give 
themselves differently, and are constituted differently, than something that I perceive (as 
being). This central insight of  Husserlian phenomenology entails that different spheres of  
reason allow for their particular type of  reflection. If  I can reflect on acts of  valuing and 
willing to make their implicit doxic theses thematic, such as by reflecting on my valuing 
of  this flower as beautiful to make explicit the thesis of  the flower as being, then there are 
ways to attend to those same acts and what is given in them through practical and aesthetic 
reflections that lead to corresponding attitudes. While it is certainly possible to relate to 
phenomena theoretically, which can mean in a phenomenological attitude, it is also possible 
to relate to them practically and aesthetically, i.e., in different attitudes.
 On the basis of  this plural, often-unnoticed aspect of  the Husserlian notions of  attitude, 
one answer to the question of  what connects Guenther’s and Al-Saji’s accounts is that they 
adopt attitudes defined phenomenologically; attitudes that display interests in the given, or 
manners of  relating to phenomena, that a general phenomenology of  constitution classifies 
as distinct though interrelated; respectively practical and affective attitudes. The broad 
question “what is phenomenological about critical phenomenology” can be reformulated 
as follows: what kinds of  attitudes does critical phenomenology employ? 
 One of  the strengths of  critical phenomenology may be the plurality of  attitudes it 
adopts, not just in each of  its instantiations but in what concerns the variety of  thinkers it 
can accommodate under the umbrella of  its community. However, if  Guenther’s version 
of  critical phenomenology is primarily practical while Al-Saji’s is affective and, as such, 
does not commit to transformative ends in the same way Guenther does, such a plurality 
of  attitudes may also harbor a tension internal to critical phenomenology. This difficulty 
motivates a turn to Husserl’s own account of  how various attitudes relate to each other 
and of  how they relate to the phenomenological attitude, or indeed to phenomenology in 
general. 
I. PHENOMENOLOGY AND ITS MANY ATTITUDES
While there is only one pure theoretical attitude, Husserl uses a multitude of  other terms 
to describe the theoretical, practical, and aesthetic attitudes. In Ideas II, for example, he 
refers to the practical as a personalist, motivational, or “spiritual” attitude (1989, 199). 
The main distinction between the natural and phenomenological attitudes allows for many 
further differentiations. Within the natural attitude, I may be interested in the world in a 
multitude of  ways, including some, like the naturalist, which serve narrower, theoretical 
purposes. Importantly, while the phenomenological attitude is sharply set apart from any 
regional scientific endeavor, it is still a theoretical attitude. As a science, then, Husserlian 
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phenomenology considers the most important sphere of  reason to be judgment, not 
axiology or praxis. For Husserl, judgment has a clear privilege over valuing and willing: 
only acts of  judging are objectifying acts in the strong sense of  the term. In other words, to 
value and to will is always dependent on doxic theses, even if  they are only implicit. This 
shows that the relation between different attitudes, including the phenomenological one, 
has to be determined by the relation between spheres of  reason themselves. 
 A first important consideration is the dependence of  valuative and volitive acts on acts 
of  judgment. This dependence explains why only judgment can be studied in isolation 
through an abstractive process which brackets valuing and willing.7 However, this was 
always meant as a temporary limitation, and Husserl (2014) constantly notes that much 
remains to be learned from investigating the valuative and volitive spheres (277-79). In 
Formal and Transcendental Logic, Husserl spells out the methodological reasons for his own 
initial limitation to judgment. There are three different meanings to the word logos: speaking 
(Reden), thinking (Denken), and what is thought (Gedachtes). The second is the crucial one, 
since it signifies both reason itself  and rational thinking (Husserl 1969, 18-19/1974, 22). 
Importantly, with these descriptions Husserl clarifies that scientific thinking, which must guide 
a science of  logos, is only one of  the specific characters of  reason; “thought” in general—he 
puts the word in brackets—is much broader than judgment and must be attended to as “the 
frame within which the specifically logical must be isolated” (1969, 26/1974, 30). In other 
words, there is much more to Denken than its scientific lane. Yet Husserl goes on, after such 
an announcement, to nonetheless quite rapidly limit himself  to judgment, thereby isolating 
the logical, as is the aim of  the book. Immediately after having enumerated judicative, 
valuing and practical reason, he further specifies: 
If  we follow the signification of  the word logos which is the richest in 
content and has been, so to speak, raised to a higher power, namely 
reason, and if  we also give pre-eminence to scientific reason, we have 
already thereby delimited at the same time a distinctive sphere of  
acts and significations, precisely as a sphere to which science, as a 
rational activity, relates particularly. Scientific thinking, the continual 
activity of  the scientist, is judicative thinking: not just any judicative 
thinking, but one that is formed, ordered, connected, in certain 
manners—according to final ideas of  reason (26/30).
For Husserl, it is because genuine science must be restricted to investigating the pure 
possibilities of  rational life, because it must be free from any “restriction to the factual,” 
that scientific thinking is judicative and not valuative or volitive. It is also because of  the 
centrality of  judicative thinking for science that later in Formal and Transcendental Logic, when 
Husserl mentions the need for an expansion of  logic to “the whole positional sphere,” such 
an expansion would still maintain only a theoretical interest in the spheres of  valuing and 
7 This peculiarity of  willing in particular, namely that it cannot be studied in isolation, amazes Husserl 
in his lectures on ethics from 1920. He writes: “But the essence of  willing is so wonderful that it cannot, 
like judging, have its truth in isolation” [Aber so wunderbar ist das Wesen des Wollens, dass es nicht wie das Urteilen 
seine Wahrheit in der Isolierung haben kann] (2004, 252, author’s translation).  
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willing (Husserl 1969, 135/1974, 140).8 The new doctrines of  reason emerging thereby 
are pure axiology and a pure theory of  practice; though they turn their attention to other 
spheres of  thinking, they still bracket specific acts of  the same kinds. Simply put, as pure 
sciences, pure axiology and praxis must be as equally free from acts of  valuing and willing 
as formal logic. Nevertheless, despite Husserl’s own emphasis, if  pre-eminence is no longer 
given to scientific thinking, the broader signification of  the word logos can re-enter the 
stage. Husserl himself  does also discuss, after all, the possibility not just of  an expansion of  
scientific thinking to valuative and volitional acts but of  distinctly practical and aesthetic 
attitudes. 
 The aesthetic attitude involves feelings of  value, but also sensory and emotive experiences, 
such as joy, pain, love, or pleasure. In First Philosophy, Husserl gives the example of a botanist 
looking at a flower who could thereby be theoretically interested in it or aesthetically 
interested the same object (Gegenstand). For Husserl, if  there is a change of  interest from the 
theoretical to the aesthetic and vice versa, there is also a change of  attitudes; the flower can 
be experienced as bearing natural properties, but it can also be experienced as beautiful, 
or as having a pleasant smell (2019, 303/1996, 99). Importantly, aesthetic experience is 
originarily a feeling and occurs at an affective level. Accordingly, while it is a law of  essence 
that any valuative act can be made doxically thematic, such that the flower can be now 
posited to be beautiful, such explicit positing is in no way necessary for the experience of  
the flower as beautiful to be possible, nor can the sense of  my feeling of  value be reduced to 
the doxic proposition “the flower is beautiful.”9 For Husserl, experiencing the world and the 
objects given in it as in some manner valuable, in this aesthetic or affective attitude, consists 
in an entire sphere of  what it means to “think”—or of  logos in the second sense of  the term. 
 The practical attitude, closely related to the personalist attitude in Ideas II, centers on 
acts of  willing, desiring, or wishing instead of  on acts of  valuing. For this reason, it is 
sometimes identified with the natural attitude itself, as it simply refers to the manner in 
which a person habitually posits and strives to realize various ends in her personal world of  
praxis, or in the lifeworld. In the practical attitude, the ego is a fully concrete person who is 
simply living through her multiple activities and levels of  passivity.10 An interesting further 
differentiation within the practical attitude itself, however, which Husserl (2004) sketches in 
his lectures on ethics from the 1920s, is that there is also an ethical attitude which, contra the 
naïveté of  the personalist one, involves reflection on praxis (244-58). That Husserl develops 
a specifically ethical attitude brings him much closer to critical phenomenology than his 
description of  a broadly practical attitude in Ideas II does, since what is distinctive about 
8 Husserl (1969) writes: “Now it is instructive to note also that what we have said about judging and 
judgment-sense holds good for the whole sphere of  positional consciousness.” He continues: “This has great 
significance, because it opens up the possibility of  broadening the idea of  formal logic to include a formal 
axiology and a formal theory of  practice” (136).
9 Husserl (2014) makes this most clear in Ideas I: “Each “posit,” e.g., each wish-posit, can thus be 
transformed into a doxic posit . . . and a wish-posit” (233).
10 See notably paragraph 49 of  Ideas II, “The personalistic atttitude versus the naturalistic” (Husserl 
1989, 183-222).
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ethics is that it requires a reflection on the motives of  value guiding the will. This attitude 
practically reflects on how these values act as norms that standardize action and does so by 
turning to the web of  motivations making up personal and social life (Husserl 2014, 234). 
Importantly, this is still no transcendental attitude, since it does not bracket valuing and 
willing but on the contrary evaluates the specific practical possibilities of  a person. The 
ethical attitude therefore involves a type of  reflection that is moved neither by pure nor 
theoretical interests but by distinctly practical ones. For Husserl, value motives and posited 
ends are reflected on but not doxically neutralized—their accompanying doxic theses are 
not suspended—since the practical goal is precisely to figure out what to do given those 
specific circumstances, and not to determine what are the a priori structures of  valuing and 
willing in general. This would be the task of  pure axiology and praxis, not of  personalist 
ethics. 
 In sum, what Husserl (2014) establishes as “the possibility, indeed, the necessity” 
of  a theory of praxis and value, expanding from an initial focus on judgment to other 
spheres of  reason, quickly turns into the broader and difficult question of  the meaning of  
phenomenology as praxis (234). When Husserlian phenomenology refrains from bracketing 
all acts of  valuing and willing in order to access the field of  pure lived experience, and 
instead continues to have practical and affective interests, new attitudes emerge. 
II. GUENTHER BETWEEN HUSSERL AND FOUCAULT: 
ON PHENOMENOLOGY AS PRAXIS
Guenther (2020) describes and employs phenomenology as praxis and, more specifically, as 
a “hybrid phenomenological practice,” because it targets not just transcendental structures 
of  consciousness but “quasi-transcendental social structures” (15).  The latter include 
though are not limited to patriarchy, white supremacy, heteronormativity, and settler 
colonialism. Importantly, the “quasi” modifies the transcendental in order to account for 
the contingent and specifically oppressive historical genesis of  such structures, along with 
their sedimentation and normativity.11 To the extent that the “ultimate goal of  critical 
phenomenology is not just to interpret the world, but also to change it,” Guenther contends 
that, as its practitioners, we should not restrict ourselves to engaging with what is invariant in 
lived experience but must pay phenomenological attention to historically situated, specific 
circumstances (16). The question is what such phenomenological attention amounts to and 
whether and how it also adopts a Husserlian account of  the phenomenological attitude. 
11 The sense in which I use “normativity” in this paper is distinct from normalization, which is prominently
used in fields like disability studies, feminist ethics, and queer theory, and as such is distinct also from the 
Foucauldian concept of  normalizing power. Rather, my use of  normativity simply refers to the positing 
of  a basic value as the norm of  a given activity, i.e., the adherence to this norm as the “good” to be 
realized. It tracks Husserl’s (1970) efinition of  normativity in the Logical Investigations and as it evolves in 
particular in his digression to the 1920 lectures on ethics (34; 2004, 321-62). Though Husserl also speaks 
of  normalization (Normalisierung), and while normativity clearly contributes to normalization, i.e., the 
positing of  a specific norm can itself  be normalized, it is normativity that this paper mainly discusses. 
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Does the investigation of  quasi-transcendental structure require a continued description 
of  transcendental ones? If  Guenther works with both the transcendental and the quasi-
transcendental, as she comes to confirm in her paper published in this volume, then the 
question turns to how exactly critical phenomenology continues to use a phenomenological 
method while also working in what can be conceived as a practical attitude. The notion 
of  attitude becomes very useful in clarifying not just what is phenomenological about 
phenomenology, but whether what is critical about it entails a rejection of  the possibility of  
a pure phenomenological attitude. Unlike an approach that would follow Merleau-Ponty 
in pointing to the impossibility of  completing the phenomenological reduction and of  
accessing the realm of  pure consciousness, the alliance of  the phenomenological attitude in 
the Husserlian sense with a different, practical attitude, might be precisely what Guenther 
means by a hybrid phenomenological practice. 
 Guenther’s account of  quasi-transcendental structures, however, is similar to a 
Foucauldian stance and, specifically, to Foucault’s version of  the Husserlian notion of  the 
historical a priori that Husserl develops mainly in the Crisis texts (Foucault 1972, 142-48).12 
Importantly, Guenther echoes Foucault’s transformed account more than Husserl’s because 
the “quasi-transcendental” historicizes the a priori further than Husserl ever did. As Burt C. 
Hopkins (2005) notes, what is most important for Husserl with this historical a priori is that it 
demonstrates not a contradiction between contingency and necessity but “the inseparable 
connection between the meaning [Sinn] proper to the ideal a priori that is the defining 
characteristic of  objective knowledge and the historicity of  this meaning’s origination” 
(180). For Husserl, the historical a priori does not compromise the sharp distinction between 
forms of  essence, whether formal or material, and historically specific norms, values, or 
practices. Rather, historical apriority concerns the teleological structure of  sense (Sinn) itself  
and accordingly recognizes its historical origination as inseparable from its ideality (Husserl 
1954, 380-83; 553).
 By contrast, what Foucault describes in The Archeology of  Knowledge and what Guenther 
proposes as “quasi-transcendental structures” is no defining characteristic of  objective 
knowledge. Rather, both think that conditions for the validity of  propositions, or, for 
Foucault, the conditions for the positivity of  discourse, are epoch-specific. Foucault (1972) 
writes: “what I mean by the term is an a priori that is not a condition of  validity for 
judgments, but a condition of  reality for statements.” He further describes it as “an a priori 
not of  truths that might never be said, or really given in experience, but the a priori of  a 
history that is given, since it is that of  things actually said” (127). Guenther would agree 
with Foucault here, since her interest is also in those structures which, contra formal ones, 
have no jurisdiction independent of  contingence, as he puts it. The interest of  Foucault is 
for the real, not the ideal in a Husserlian sense: the structures one might find to be binding 
in a form of  discourse are not revealed by adopting a pure phenomenological attitude, 
because their “apriority” and invariance has historical boundaries; their apriority itself  has 
a history. What Guenther describes as quasi-transcendental structures function similarly. 
12 See the whole chapter section “The Historical a priori and the Archive.” Foucault does not make explicit 
mention of  Husserl, but the reference is nonetheless clear. 
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At the same time, Guenther is also a phenomenologist. She does retain the Husserlian 
phenomenological concept of  constitution, notably, and thereby finds herself  between 
Husserl and Foucault, as it were, juggling an acknowledgment of  what “makes the lived 
experience of  consciousness possible and meaningful” at a transcendental level, and the 
recognition that power shapes the constitution of  sense in all its strata, even in the simplest 
cases of  external perceptions (2019a, 11). Patriarchy, for example, certainly has a history 
and is thus in a sense “contingent,” yet as a quasi-transcendental structure, it prescribes, 
or rather structures, in ways that can be described phenomenologically, both forms of  
perceiving and manners of  givenness. 
 For Guenther (2021), there is a difference between forms of  consciousness described 
by “classical” phenomenology and those specific forms of  patriarchal consciousness that 
critical phenomenology is interested in. This difference would seem to require different 
methods of  description: describing the essential forms of  perceiving, feeling, imagining, 
acting, and describing the historically specific patriarchal “ways of  perceiving, feeling, 
imagining, acting.” Guenther’s position can then be read as another revised historical a 
priori invested in the idea that there are regularities to be described in socio-historically 
generated manners of  being directed at the world and objects given in it. This is not 
quite a Husserlian position, because it is interested in the quasi-transcendental; nor is 
it fully Foucauldian, because it remains committed to the phenomenological notions of  
intentionality and the constitution of  sense. Guenther’s (2019b) article “Seeing Like a Cop: 
A Critical Phenomenology of  Whiteness as Property” provides a very clear example of  
this: there are regularities to perceptual practices of  suspicious surveillance which are based 
on the protection of  whiteness as property and involve the exposure of  targeted others to 
state violence. Such a phenomenological description of  a manner of  perceiving and of  its 
violent effects is simultaneously meant to disrupt that same manner of  perceiving. This is 
a new method for describing the historical a priori with the intent of  transforming what it 
describes. 
 A further key implication of  Guenther’s (2021) hybrid practice is that this praxis is an 
ethical one; crucial to the method is “an ethical orientation toward practices of  freedom.” 
It aims for transformations that are guided by specific values, guided by the will to make 
things “less wrong, less harmful, less oppressive” (19). Guenther even goes as far as to call 
freedom “not just contingently preferable to oppression” but “an a priori good” (14). This 
interestingly makes her approach akin to what Husserl sketches, in his 1920 lectures on 
ethics, as an ethical attitude. Such an attitude is distinct from a broadly construed practical 
attitude, or simply from the natural attitude, specifically because it involves reflection on 
and critique of  the value motives and ends that guide any activity (Husserl 2004, 246-47). 
At the same time, the ethical attitude is distinct from the transcendental attitude because 
it purposefully does not neutralize all positions (whether doxic, axiological or practical). 
Rather, since the aim of  the ethical attitude is to evaluate what a person should do in the 
specific circumstances of  her life, it requires consideration for personal limitations to what 
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would otherwise be much broader practical possibilities.13 Perhaps most importantly, the 
ethical attitude thereby describes what it means to be resolved to given ends and to be 
motivated by given values, while being reflective about how those same values and ends 
standardize action. This reflected life is an ethical one, precisely because of  its striving 
toward self-transparency not just about what positions are taken but about whether their 
normativity is justified, or, for Husserl, whether it is rational. As such, the ethical attitude 
can describe Guenther’s own approach to critique as analysis of  power but also provide 
the frame for a phenomenological self-critique of  value-commitments. Making a similar 
point, Guenther cites Iris Marion Young’s (1990) definition of  critical theory, which in some 
surprising ways resonates with Husserl: 
Normative reflection must begin from historically and socially 
specific circumstances because there is nothing but what is, the given, 
the situated interest in justice, from which to start (5, quoted in Guenther 
2021, 13, her emphasis). 
Consider these passages from Husserl’s (2004) lectures on ethics: 
What should I do, what does my life-situation require of  me as 
what should be (das Gesollte) done in the here and now? (7, author’s 
translation). 
It belongs to all ethical wills and doings that they are not a naïve 
doing, nor a naïve rational will, but that the same rational thing is 
willed in the consciousness of  its normativity (Normhaftigkeit) and is 
also motivated by the normativity (246-47, author’s translation).
This paper cannot address the complex question of  the relation between Husserl’s ethics 
and critical theory. However, it does propose that if  Guenther calls critical phenomenology 
a hybrid practice, it could also be understood as shifting between two different attitudes: 
the phenomenological and the ethical; one interested in transcendental structures of  
consciousness, the other in the specificities of  different lifeworlds, while at the same time 
being committed to a series of  situated posited ends, including to the reduction of  harm 
and the striving toward liberation or freedom. 
13 Husserl makes this point not just in his lectures on ethics but in Ideas II, where he writes about the spiritual 
“I can” and the notion of  practical possibility as irreducible to physical possibility but limited to what a 
person would or would not usually do. He writes: “‘I could do it’—that is the neutrality modification of  
the action and the practical possibility derived from it. ‘Yet I could not do it’—I am lacking the original 
consciousness of  being able to do this action or of  having the power for this action (which, even in the 
case of  a fictional action, is an originary non-neutralized consciousness); this action contradicts the kind 
of  person that I am, my way of  letting myself  be motivated” (1989, 277/1952, 265). This focus on the 
person and her abilities, personality, and environment, has led to an identification of  Husserl’s ethics as 
a personalist one, where living an ethical life is a matter of  living one’s “best possible life” (Husserl 2004, 
244; Melle 2007; Peucker 2008; Heinämaa 2014).
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 The precise relation between the ethical and phenomenological attitudes, however, 
remains an open question. Husserl himself  never clarifies this rapport, in part because the 
notion of  the ethical attitude is under-defined, and because his ethical thinking in general 
is never systematically developed but only presented through lectures and unpublished 
manuscripts.14 In turning to Guenther we may ask: does her descriptive practice targeting 
quasi-transcendental structures really need to be complemented by a description of  
transcendental structures? The answer seems to be affirmative, even if  the precise meaning 
of  “transcendental” remains to be determined.15 While Guenther (2021) speaks of  critical 
phenomenology not as a science but as a praxis, she does also recognize that there are 
“necessary but insufficient” meanings of  critique, including transcendental inquiry, to 
be found in “classical phenomenology” (10). This lack of  sufficiency is what motivates a 
turn to what can be called an “ethical attitude,” but it does not efface the necessity of  a 
transcendental critique of  reason that would determine its essential features. The meaning 
of  the purity of  such inquiry, and while the sharpness of  the distinction between the 
natural and phenomenological attitudes, are matters of  debate that cannot be settled here. 
Nevertheless, an ethical attitude does turn to the given, describe manners of  givenness 
and forms of  intentionality, understand intentional acts to be motivated and not caused, 
recognize that phenomenological perception of  lived experience is possible without reducing 
it to inner perception, and understand practical possibility in terms of  the lived body and its 
correlated environment. In other words, insofar as the ethical attitude continues to use core 
phenomenological concepts, it is not foreclosing but on the contrary seems to be requiring 
the possibility of  adopting various attitudes, including the phenomenological one. 
 In short, in the striking words of  Foucault (1972) himself, admittedly in a very different 
context: “The formal a priori and the historical a priori share neither the same level nor the 
same nature: if  they intersect, it is because they occupy two different dimensions” (144).16 
Translating this back to Husserl’s vocabulary: formal investigation of  the spheres of  reason 
may lead to forms of  essence, differentiating for example between forms of  perceiving and 
valuing, but the geneses of  historically specific circumstances and their regularities can only 
14 Husserl’s lectures on ethics are published in his Einleitung in die Ethik. Vorlesungen Sommersemester 1920 und 
1924 (Hua 37), and most of  his unpublished manuscripts of  the same period (from after the war onwards) 
are collected in the Grenzprobleme der Phänomenologie (Hua 42).
15 One ambiguity of  Guenther’s hybrid practice is indeed whether the transcendental inquiry that 
accompanies a turn to quasi-transcendental structures entails that the phenomenological attitude is a 
pure phenomenological attitude. While the meaning of  “purity” changes throughout Husserl’s work, and 
needs not mean abstraction from concrete or factual circumstances, the difficulty of  establishing the 
relation between the phenomenological attitude as a (possibly pure) theoretical attitude and the ethical 
attitude as a practical one reflects the challenge of  critical phenomenology itself  as an investigation 
which aims both at description and transformation. While there is clearly a sense in which Guenther’s 
hybrid practice means that the phenomenological attitude itself  needs to be ethically deployed, there is 
a difference between an ethical phenomenological attitude and a phenomenologically conceived ethical 
praxis, i.e., an ethical attitude. Importantly, these questions will be asked very differently by Al-Saji.
16 The translation has been modified to better illustrate the contrast between the two kinds of  a prioris.
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be approached in attitudes that do not bracket those same circumstances, and as such are 
not performing the universal epoché, even if  they are reflexive, as is the ethical attitude. In 
this sense, there is no need to choose between “classical” and “critical” phenomenology; on 
the contrary, it can be understood as a strength of  the critical phenomenological approach 
that it is interested in both transcendental and quasi-transcendental structures. Through 
a renewed investigation of  both kinds of  structures, phenomenology, shifting between a 
plurality of  attitudes, can continue to clarify its subject matter.17 
III. AL-SAJI AND THE FANONIAN PHENOMENOLOGY OF AFFECT
There is another attitude to consider, which further strengthens the idea of  critical 
phenomenology as employing a plurality of  attitudes. If  Guenther understands critical 
phenomenology primarily as a praxis, Al-Saji develops of  a phenomenology of  affect that 
can analogously be read as adopting a primarily affective orientation—that is, neither a 
theoretical nor a practical one. In her lectures at the 2019 Collegium Phaenomenologicum, Al-
Saji develops a Fanonian phenomenology of  affect and touch. Referencing a passage from 
the last chapter of  Black Skin, White Masks, she cites: “we need to touch all the wounds that 
score the black livery” [nous avons besoin de toucher du doigt toutes les plaies qui zèbrent la livrée 
noire] (2019a, 7; Fanon 1967, 187). For Fanon, this “need” is related to what he identifies 
as the threat to Black intellectuals that they become mired by universals. The danger is 
for the specificity of  Black experience to become lost to universal and overly theoretical, 
intellectualized claims, including theories on violence, for example. With this passage, 
Fanon is suggesting that such a problematic universal standpoint can be avoided if  the 
wounds of  colonialism are “touched” instead of  observed from afar. He states as an explicit 
goal of  his writing that it aims to “feel from within [ressentir du dedans] the despair of  the 
17 Duane D. Davis (2020), in his piece “The Phenomenological Method” in 50 Concepts for a Critical* 
Phenomenology, suggests that in Ideas I, Husserl’s use of  the term überschiebung (overlapping) to describe the 
relation between the natural and phenomenological attitudes, is key to understanding how the radical 
distinction between both attitudes does not preclude their close connection, overlapping, or intercrossing 
(6).  If  the phenomenological attitude targets “objects as meant” or “objects as intended” all the while 
suspending their doxic theses, its targets indeed “overlap” with those objects that appear to me in the 
natural attitude. Something similar could be said of  the ethical attitude: even if  we maintain a distinction 
between it and the phenomenological, or even it and the natural, insofar as it involves practical reflection, 
the “objects” it targets—the intended objects of  my wills and valuations—are no different from those 
that appear to me in the natural attitude when I am not questioning them (7). In her 2018 article “The 
Difference of  Feminist Phenomenology: The Case of  Shame,” Bonnie Mann provides another reference 
point for understanding what moving between attitudes might be: the idea of  oscillation she takes up 
from Beauvoir. This oscillation moves “from the most concrete, particular, and located events and 
perspectives, to the general features of  human experience, and back again” (57). Moving between the 
phenomenological and the ethical attitudes specifies what such a movement might entail: not quite an 
oscillation between the general and the particular but between the phenomenological and the practical; 
this indeed does not mean finding the pure experience “behind” the contingent but could be read as 
changing attitudes to look at the same, concrete circumstances.
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man of  color confronting the white man.”18 He also writes, though the tactile meaning is 
lost in translation, “In this work I have made a point to convey [toucher] the misery of  the 
Black man. Physically [Tactilement] and affectively” (Fanon 1967, 86; see Al-Saji 2019b, 19). 
In short, a Fanonian phenomenology of  affect warns of  the risks of  jumping to new arches 
and universal principles. On Al-Saji’s reading, this is in part why Fanon instead wants 
to take the time to attend to the concrete and specific wounds of  colonialism; to touch 
them, dwell on them, feel them from within. The advantage of  reading this as an affective 
attitude, then, is that it accounts for how this is no practical attitude—it is not committed to 
transformative ends from the start—and how it can still affectively intervene, as it were, or 
disrupt, manners of  perceiving and feeling. 
 Such fore-grounding of  affect involves feeling (ressentir) or enduring (éprouver) more 
than looking at, more than turning into a visual spectacle, or, on the contrary, altogether 
forgetting what Fanon describes in “The North African Syndrome” as the continuing burn 
of  the colonial past (2006, 12; see Al-Saji 2019a, 3).19 In contrast to Guenther, Fanon’s 
phenomenology of  affect dwells and waits: it is not a praxis aimed at transformation. As 
such, dwelling in a present that carries the affective past, and specifically the colonial past, 
preserves a deep ambivalence with respect to the future. By focusing on this touching of  
Black pain that Fanon announces as one of  the goals of  Black Skin, White Masks, Al-Saji seems 
to be bracketing the entire debate surrounding the Fanonian description of  decolonization 
as having to begin with a tabula rasa, a blank slate for a new humanism and a new man. 
In other words, this emphasis on dwelling is bracketing how to read Fanon’s “narrative of  
liberation” (Taylor 1989). Al-Saji (2019b) herself  explicitly contrasts her work with that of  
David Scott and Fred Moten and their insistence on the potential for liberation (12). Her 
approach is also different from the work of  Lewis C. Gordon, whose reading of  Fanon, 
like Al-Saji’s, focuses on Black lived experience though still reads him as a revolutionary 
existential humanist who, identifying the true crisis of  European Man in its racism and 
colonialism, “demands a forward leap on the question and questioning of  humanity” 
(1995, 38). It is significant that Al-Saji does not take this second step. To dwell is precisely 
not to leap. The result is that the cumbersome normative question surrounding Fanonian 
teleology and universal dialectics is, while not ignored, at least reborn, reformulated, re-
localized, even “somatized” in the subtler though no less dramatic movement of  touching 
the wounds of  colonialism.
 Importantly, dwelling is also not, strictly speaking, an activity. In a related manner, Al-
Saji shows that the level at which Fanon speaks of  affect and pain remains well below that 
of  intentional acts of  constitution. It is in this context that she turns to Husserl, reading him 
through Fanon to critically retool two phenomenological concepts: sensings (Empfindnisse) 
18 The translation has been modified not to lose the meaning of  “ressentir du dedans” as akin to an internal 
sensation, pointing at once to psychological and affective dimensions.
19 Al-Saji cites Fanon’s (2006) original French: “un passé cuisant” from  “Le ‘syndrome nord africain’” in 
Pour la révolution africaine.
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and the affective relief.20 The key aspect of  specifically touch sensings for Al-Saji is precisely 
that, though “they are preconditions for the Body to become an organ of  will (“I can”), 
touch sensings fail to reach the level of  explicit egoic activity” (2019a, 14; Husserl 1989, 
152). Sensings are non-objectivating; rather, they found the lived body through sensibility. 
This is what Husserl (1989) calls a “hyletic substrate” (hyletische Unterlage) in Ideas II: the 
basic layer of  experience which founds all objectivities (Gegenständlichkeiten) through varying 
degrees of  mediacy (160). Hyle is a term Husserl uses to designate the “stuff” (Stoff) that 
gives its content to any intentional act animating it, forming a unity of  sense. In his Analyses 
on Passive Syntheses, he develops a notion of  affective relief  that complicates this prior account 
of  hyletic data, no longer pictured as points. Sensings are now understood to form an entire 
field, which importantly is not a mere plane, as if  it were reducible to the surface of  the 
skin. Rather, it involves an affective relief, that is, a whole landscape registering the depth of  
sensation both materially and temporally, with varying degrees of  affective pull (2001, 212). 
 Additionally, if  it is the wounds of  the colonial past that are touched by Fanon’s writing, 
then a phenomenology of  racialization is not just a phenomenology of  affect but of  time. 
Turning to this temporal question, Al-Saji coins the term colonial duration to account for 
enduring presence at an affective and bodily level. Colonial duration carries the affective 
weight of  the past as past in the present, not just as a sedimented social structure but in 
“experiences” such as unlocalizable pain, affective pathologies, and other disrupting bodily 
affects. Interestingly, Al-Saji here breaks with Husserl, turning to Bergson instead, because 
affective weight has longue durée. Specifically, the colonial past is present as past without the 
need for an act of  remembrance; it does not rely on subjective activity or even passivity 
to be present. It is there materially in the pain. As Al-Saji (2019c) concludes her Collegium 
lectures, echoing the words of  Édouard Glissant, “to live under the weight of  colonial 
duration is to experience a ‘painful sense of  time’” (23).
 Yet the key to this entire framework of  affect and time is that the rhythms of  such 
colonial duration can be sabotaged, even interrupted. Al-Saji (2019a) speaks of  how Fanon’s 
writing “resuscitates” colonial wounds as “feelings,” enlivening a past that would otherwise 
be seen as dead (11). I read her phenomenology of  affect and touch as letting “dead time” 
endure, laisser durer le temps mort, not for directly practical or theoretical reasons but affective 
ones, indeed with the sole initial aim of  dwelling on wounds. Though Al-Saji does not 
use this language, such dwelling and waiting can be understood as an affective attitude 
because it apprehends what is felt through feeling itself  instead of  through theoretical or 
practical reason. Feeling can be broadly understood as including its basic psychosomatic 
20 There is an important difference between what Al-Saji herself  cites as sensible feelings and drives from 
“the sphere of  the heart” and those coming from the sphere of  judgment (Husserl 2001, 150; Al-Saji 
2019b, 2). Quite interestingly, in his lectures on ethics, Husserl describes the most basic value-feelings as 
analogous to sensings; they too are the most basic stratum to constitution, now in the sphere of  valuing 
instead of  judging broadly construed (as doxic positing) (see Husserl 2004, 260-01; 1988, 205). Though 
this sphere of  feeling still has a doxic substrate, Husserl does write of  this sphere that it involves “ein 
Gefühlsmeinen mit einem sozusagen fühlenden Erfahren, einem fühlenden Selbst-Haben des Wertes, des Wertes selbst in 
seiner vollen“ [the meaning of  a feeling with a so to speak fulfilling experience, a fulfilling self-having of  the 
value, of  the value itself  in its fullness] (224, author’s translation). In other words, values are value-feelings 
which can be more or less fulfilled, as something meant in that feeling, by an experience of  value.
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sense along with emotions, feeling (Gefühl) or what Husserl calls a felt disposition (Gemüt). 
Though Husserl mostly describes affective orientations through the example of  aesthetic 
feelings of  value, such as appreciation for the beauty of  a flower, this can be extended to any 
feeling, indeed to the whole affective sphere. The key aspect of  the kind of  the approach 
Al-Saji reads in Fanon is that it occurs at a passive level, prior to the activity that would be 
involved in liberatory praxis. Letting painful affects endure—a word particularly well-suited 
to this case—can be disruptive at a passive level.21 This means the idea of  “dead time” is 
not just opposed to the liveliness of  the colonial lifeworld: it also suspends its temporality. It 
is literally a time-out, a time for a break. This is a path of  sensibility, affect, and passivity, a 
path through affective reliefs themselves, toward the interruption of  colonial duration.  
 The relation between affect and time is thus crucial, but so is the relation between time 
and possibility. For Al-Saji, colonial duration forecloses “the very structure of  practical 
possibility.” This statement is much stronger than the thought that the practical possibilities 
of  the colonized are determined by the colonial world. Rather, the realm of  practical 
possibilities itself  is being killed off—there is no room to act for the colonized. And it is 
precisely “the affective relief  of  the present” that is “left without leeway” (2019a, 3). Between 
the I and the affective pull of  objects, there is supposed to be such Spielraum, room to 
breathe, to play, to will, to desire, to choose, to feel, to resist. 
 Al-Saji (2019b) references specifically practical possibilities in this passage, but it is also 
implicitly the case when she speaks of  how Fanon’s writing “permits us to be conscious of  
‘une possibilité d’exister’ [a possibility of  existence] other than what colonialism projects for us” 
(18; Fanon 1967, 100/97). Simply put, practical possibilities are foreclosed but consciousness 
of  alternatives is not. Al-Saji (2019b) makes a similar point when she writes that touch, in 
Fanon, “can take the form of  interruptive transport and nostalgic re-memory of  foreclosed 
possibilities” (18). These possibilities, while presently closed off, are not impossible to be 
felt. Al-Saji’s (2019c) interpretation of  Fanon’s description of  “explosion” in Black Skin, 
White Masks speaks of  the same thing: “the possibility of  exploding (and not just the reality 
of  explosion) has yet to be created” (2, Al-Saji’s emphasis). Again, it is the very possibility of  
existing differently that is lacking. Fanon too makes a similar point when commenting on 
how “utopian” it is to expect of  the Black or the Arab that they integrate abstract values to 
their worldview if  they hardly ever have enough to eat. He writes: “in the absolute sense, 
nothing stands in the way of  such things. Nothing—except that the people in question lack 
the opportunities [les intéressés n’en ont pas la possibilité] (1967, 96/1952, 93). The tone here is 
almost humorous: nothing stands in their way, apart from the fact that circumstances make 
it impossible. In this specific case, it is the affect of  hunger that forecloses the possible. Al-
Saji (2019c) takes up this passage and concludes: “The affect of  the colonized calls for more 
than nutrition; it calls for inventing sociality and ways of  living and dying, on one’s own 
terms, from the reconfigured ruin of  foreclosed and dead possibilities” (6). 
21 The verb “to endure” is particularly well suited here, because it translates the French word “éprouver” 
as much as “durer” which respectively mean to feel and to last. 
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 With this revealing statement, Al-Saji has moved from the affective sphere to that 
of  praxis, though from a different perspective than Guenther. This is a pivotal point in 
her writing, because it shows the close connection between affect and what are distinctly 
practical possibilities. The distinction between affective and practical attitudes accounts 
for why the foreclosure of  practical possibilities forecloses also the whole sphere of  acts of  
the will—and, crucially, it also explains why an affective attitude may have to be initially 
adopted. In a sense, the point Al-Saji is making is that praxis is not an option for the colonized, 
but that affect can never be foreclosed in the same way. Pain can always be felt, even if  
action is rendered impossible. 
 What Fanon wants his patients to acquire is the possibility to choose, even between 
activity or passivity, in face of  what turns out to be the real source of  the conflict: not their 
unconscious, or the so-called inferiority complex, but social structures (1967, 100/1952, 
97). In other words, he wants them to enter the realm of  praxis, to no longer be governed 
by paralyzing affects. A turn to the notion of  attitudes shows that what Al-Saji calls the 
sabotage of  colonial duration, a dwelling on the wounds of  colonialism, turns out to move 
between affect and praxis; in the end, it does target those same structures which Guenther 
calls “quasi-transcendental” though from a different attitude. 
IV. CRITICAL PHENOMENOLOGY:  
TURNING TO PHENOMENA THROUGH A PLURALITY OF ATTITUDES
The natural attitude is not fixed or unalterable but on the contrary is a developmental 
phenomenon, constantly changing along with the environment of  a person. There are 
ethical, practical, affective modes to the natural attitude that can be transformative for 
the natural attitude itself. One can indeed gain many phenomenological insights while 
remaining in it. Gail Weiss (2016) discusses this point in her article “De-Naturalizing the 
Natural Attitude: A Husserlian Legacy to Social Phenomenology,” showing the diversity 
and frequency of  experiences which can disrupt the natural attitude from within, as it 
were. She references, as an example, how the Rodney King and Trayvon Martin cases 
“profoundly disrupted the natural attitude of  many white Americans” by putting in question 
their assumptions about fairness and justice in the United States (13). At the same time, it 
should be noted that another feature of  the natural attitude is that it quite forcefully resists 
radical change. Weiss (2016) nonetheless concludes:
These experiences and these conversations are precisely what are 
needed, not to eradicate the natural attitude, for that is neither 
possible nor desirable, but rather to guarantee that it will continue to 
transform, rather than remain fixed, in response to new experiences 
that pose challenges to it. This, for me, is precisely the promise of  
the not so natural, natural attitude, as Husserl first described it over 
a century ago (. . . ). Rather than viewing the natural attitude, and 
even phenomenology for that matter, as an outdated concept and 
method that must be jettisoned in favor of  newer terms and newer 
methods that are explicitly geared toward our current experiences, I 
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believe they still have their whole lives before them, waiting for us to 
take them up in our own distinctive ways and put them to work. (14)
One way to put the natural attitude to work is to explore its many modes, shifting not just 
between regions of  being, but between spheres of  reason—from how and what we judge, 
to how and what we value and will, and even to how and what we feel. Guenther’s and 
Al-Saji’s respective approaches to critical phenomenology show how ethical and affective 
attitudes can continue to transform the natural attitude itself. 
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